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ABSTRACT
As algorithms are increasingly used to make important decisions
that affect human lives, ranging from social benefit assignment to
predicting risk of criminal recidivism, concerns have been raised
about the fairness of algorithmic decision making. Most prior works
on algorithmic fairness normatively prescribe how fair decisions
ought to be made. In contrast, here, we descriptively survey users
for how they perceive and reason about fairness in algorithmic
decision making.
A key contribution of this work is the framework we propose
to understand why people perceive certain features as fair or unfair
to be used in algorithms. Our framework identifies eight properties
of features, such as relevance, volitionality and reliability, as latent
considerations that inform people’s moral judgments about the
fairness of feature use in decision-making algorithms. We validate
our framework through a series of scenario-based surveys with
576 people. We find that, based on a person’s assessment of the
eight latent properties of a feature in our exemplar scenario, we
can accurately (> 85%) predict if the person will judge the use of
the feature as fair.
Our findings have important implications. At a high-level, we
show that people’s unfairness concerns are multi-dimensional and
argue that future studies need to address unfairness concerns be-
yond discrimination. At a low-level, we find considerable disagree-
ments in people’s fairness judgments. We identify root causes of
the disagreements, and note possible pathways to resolve them.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Algorithms trained over data about past decisions are increasingly
used to assist or replace human decision making in life-affecting
scenarios, such as determining if an unemployed person should be
eligible for a certain level of social welfare benefits [44] or deciding
if a person should be let out on bail pending trial [5]. Given their
potential impact on human lives, concerns have been raised about
the fairness of the decisions made by algorithms [1, 5, 7, 22].
Concerns about algorithmic unfairness have led to much re-
cent work on detecting and mitigating discrimination in decision-
making scenarios. This work includes finding ways to operational-
ize notions of direct and indirect discrimination and provide mech-
anisms [17, 21, 32, 40, 47, 60–62] for non-discriminatory learning,
as well as examining the feasibility of making non-discriminatory
decisions [12, 14, 24, 35].
Existing studies of algorithmic fairness are largely normative
(prescriptive) in nature, i.e., they begin by defining how fair deci-
sions should (or ought to) be made, assuming that there is societal
consensus around what constitutes fair decision making [26]. In
this paper, we pursue a complementary descriptive (comparative)
approach towards fair decision making. Inspired by works in de-
scriptive ethics [26], we conduct empirical studies in one specific
context, to learn what people perceive as fair decision making, with
the goal of uncovering the moral reasoning behind their percep-
tions. Later, we discuss how our findings can be leveraged to design
fair decision-making algorithms.
As perceptions of fairness are multi-dimensional and context-
dependent, characterizing them presents a difficult challenge. In this
work, we propose to understand how people make judgments about
the fairness of using individual features in decision making. More
concretely, we seek to measure and analyze how people would
answer the following question: Is it fair to use a feature (F ) in
a given decision making scenario (S)?
We center our investigation of fairness perceptions around the
above question for multiple reasons: First, people’s judgments about
fairness of using features can be leveraged to learn fair algorithmic
decision making, as shown in our recent work [28, 29]. Second,
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while the question, “is this feature fair to use,” is intuitive and
simple to comprehend, people’s answers (as our study shows) can
be analyzed to reveal the extent to which different types of fairness
considerations, such as whether or not a given feature is volitional
or causes the outcome, factor into their judgments.
OurContributions.We collected and analyzed fairness judgments
from a survey of 576 people. We asked survey participants to as-
sess the fairness of using different features that are inputs to COM-
PAS [5], a commercial criminal risk estimation tool that is in current
use to help make judicial decisions in the US about bail decisions.1
To model the factors that drive participants’ fairness judgments,
we propose a set of eight latent properties of features that we hy-
pothesize capture most of the considerations that influence people’s
fairness judgments. Our framework of eight properties includes un-
fairness concerns beyond discrimination, such as whether a feature
is privacy sensitive and whether it is volitional (see Section 2).
When asked to assess the fairness of using the different input
features to COMPAS for making bail decisions, the majority of
our respondents judged that half of the features are unfair to use.
Interestingly, the latent properties the respondents’ considered in
reaching their judgments were mostly unrelated to discrimination,
highlighting the need to consider additional unfairness concerns.
Unfortunately, we also find that there is a lack of clear consensus
in respondents’ judgments about the fairness of using a number
of features. Our analysis attempts to explain the lack of consensus
by modeling people’s fairness judgments as a two-part decision
process: one related to how people assess the latent properties of a
feature, and a second related to how they morally reason about the
fairness of using a feature given that is has certain latent properties.
We find that the lack of consensus in our respondents’ fair-
ness judgments can be largely attributed to disagreements in how
they estimated the latent properties – particularly those related to
causal reasoning, such as whether a feature causes the outcome
or is caused by sensitive group membership. However, we find
that respondents use similar moral reasoning in reaching fairness
judgments if given a set of latent properties. Specifically, we were
able to learn a single, simple classifier which performs accurately
in predicting respondents’ fairness judgments from their latent
property assessments.
Implications. Our findings are striking because they suggest that
the differences in people’s fairness judgments may originate not
from the differences in their inherently more subjective moral rea-
soning about how to weigh different latent properties when judging
fairness of features, but rather from differences in their seemingly
more objective assessments of latent properties of features. As such,
our findings point towards a future for fair algorithmic decision
making where the latent properties of a feature (e.g., whether it
causes the outcome) might be objectively determined from exten-
sive data, while there is hope that the moral reasoning that people
use to map the latent properties to fairness might be consistently
determined using input from people (e.g., collected via surveys).
1COMPASmay also be used for criminal sentencing and parole decisions, but we do not
explore those uses here since they involve other relevant factors such as considering
the role of long term incarceration in society.
2 JUDGING FEATURE USAGE FAIRNESS
Many works in psychological decision theory propose that people
use heuristics to assess situations and reach decisions [2, 18]. These
heuristics may vary according to the situation and to people’s
level of knowledge about the situational elements, helping to parse
information into more manageable and meaningful pieces [27].
We hypothesize that when determining whether a feature is
fair to be used in a decision making scenario, people rely on their
implicit or explicit assessments of certain underlying properties of
the feature as a heuristic. So our framework for how people judge
feature usage fairness consists of two-parts. In the first part, we
conjecture eight latent properties of a given feature as potential
determinants for how people judge the fairness of using the feature.
In the second part, we hypothesize that these latent properties are
weighted in different ways by different individuals when reaching
their fairness judgments about the feature. We draw these latent
properties from the existing literature in social-economic-political-
moral sciences, philosophy, and the law, as detailed below.
I. Reliability. Inspired by legal requirements that any admissible
evidence be reliably assessed [15, 38], fairness judgments might be
influenced by the potential for reliably assessing the feature. For
instance, an input feature to COMPAS recidivism risk prediction
is the defendant’s belief about criminality, assessed via answers to
questions of the form “Do you think that a hungry person has a
right to steal?” People who do not perceive beliefs about criminality
as reliably assessable from such questions might rate the feature as
unfair to use.
II. Relevance. Inspired by legal requirements that any admissible
evidence be relevant to the case [19, 20], fairness judgmentsmight be
influenced by a feature’s relevance to the decision making scenario.
For instance, an input feature to COMPAS recidivism risk prediction
is the defendant’s education and behavior in school, assessed via
answers to questions of the form “What were your usual grades
in high school?” People who perceive performance in school as
irrelevant to recidivism risk estimation might rate the feature as
unfair to use.
III. Privacy. Inspired by legal requirements that evidence obtained
via illegal privacy intrusions (such as searches without warrant
or unauthorized wire tapping) is inadmissible [20, 33, 58], fairness
judgments might be influenced by whether the feature is relying
on privacy-sensitive information. For instance, an input feature to
COMPAS recidivism risk prediction is the defendant’s history of
substance abuse, assessed via answers to questions of the form “Did
you use heroin, cocaine, crack, or meth as a juvenile?” People who
perceive juvenile drug use as privacy-sensitive information might
rate the feature as unfair to use.
IV. Volitionality. Inspired by philosophical arguments on luck
egalitarianism [4, 6, 43] that people should be held responsible for
the voluntary choices they make (option luck), but not penalized
for their unchosen circumstances (brute luck), fairness judgments
might be influenced by an individual’s assessment of the extent
to which a feature is volitional, i.e., the result of exercising one’s
own will. For instance, an input feature to COMPAS recidivism
risk prediction is the criminal history of the defendant’s family,
assessed via answers to questions of the form “Was your father or
mother ever arrested?” People who perceive family criminal history
as non-volitional might rate the feature as unfair to use.
V. Causes Outcome. Inspired by arguments for applying causal
reasoning in fairness [8, 34, 39, 42, 51, 54, 63], fairness judgments
might be influenced by whether a feature is likely to cause (i.e.,
increase or mitigate) the chances of the person engaging in risky
behavior. For instance, an input feature to COMPAS recidivism risk
prediction is the defendant’s current charge, assessed via answers
to questions of the form “Are you currently charged with a misde-
meanor, non-violent felony or violent felony?” People who perceive
the defendant’s current charge as causing him to recidivate might
consider the feature fair to use.
VI. Causes Vicious Cycle. Inspired by arguments for avoiding
vicious cycles of crime and poverty [25, 41], fairness judgments
might be influenced by whether a feature is likely to trap people in a
vicious cycle of increasingly risky behaviors. For instance, an input
feature to COMPAS recidivism risk prediction is the criminal history
of the defendant’s friends, assessed via answers to questions of the
form “How many of your friends have ever been arrested?” People
who perceive friends’ criminal history may create a vicious cycle
(where people with friends with criminal records are sentenced to
longer prison terms, thereby, increasing the number friends with
criminal records) might rate the feature as unfair to use.
VII. Causes Disparity in Outcomes. Inspired by the doctrine of
disparate impact in anti-discrimination laws that require statistical
parity in outcomes for people belonging to different sensitive social
groups like race or gender [7, 13], fairness judgments might be
influenced by whether a feature would result in protected group
members receiving disadvantageous treatment. For instance, an
input feature to COMPAS recidivism risk prediction is the safety of
the neighborhood the defendant is living in, assessed via answers to
questions of the form “Is there much crime in your neighborhood?”
People who perceive neighborhood safety may increase disparity
in outcomes might rate the feature as unfair to use.
VIII. Caused by Sensitive Group Membership. Inspired by the
notions of indirect discrimination in political and economic sci-
ences, where members of a social group are implicitly discrimi-
nated against using features that are correlated with or caused by
their group membership [7, 13], fairness judgments might be in-
fluenced by the extent to which a feature is caused by their group
membership. For instance, an input feature to COMPAS recidivism
risk prediction is the criminal history of the defendant’s friends,
assessed via answers to questions of the form “How many of your
friends have ever been arrested?” People who perceive friends’
criminal history as potentially caused by people’s membership of
some social groups might rate the feature as unfair to use.
Observation 1: Sufficiency and Necessity of our Latent Prop-
erties.We do not claim that our list of latent properties presented
above is exhaustive or complete. That is, there may exist other prop-
erties that might influence users’ fairness judgments. However, as
we show in Section 3.1.2, the eight properties are by and large suf-
ficient and necessary to explain fairness judgments of users in our
survey. Specifically, less than 3% of our surveyed users reported
using a property outside of our list in arriving at their judgments;
further, for each of the eight properties, at least 15% of our surveyed
users reported relying on it as a consideration in their fairness judg-
ments. Moreover, when we attempted analytically to predict users’
fairness judgments based only on their assessments of the latent
properties in Section 5.2, we found that the eight properties are not
only sufficient to make the predictions with high accuracy, but that
six of the eight are also statistically significant (i.e., necessary) for
predicting fairness judgments.
Observation 2: Unfairness beyond Discrimination. Our list of
latent properties captures a diverse set of unfairness concerns with
algorithmic decision making that go beyond discrimination, the
traditional basis for most of the existing literature on algorithmic
fairness. In fact, the two properties that were not deemed statisti-
cally significant in our prediction analysis discussed above, Causing
Disparity in Outcomes and Caused by Sensitive Group Membership,
are related to the potential for a feature to cause discrimination.
Thus, our proposed framework captures many facets of unfairness
that have previously received little attention in the fair learning
community, yet may significantly influence users’ fairness percep-
tions of algorithmic decision making.
3 METHODOLOGY
In order to gather people’s judgments about algorithmic fairness
and the latent properties that we proposed, we conducted a series
of online surveys in September and October 2017. Our methodology
was approved by our institution’s ethics review board.
3.1 Survey Design
We asked participants to respond to questions in the context of a
specific scenario that is already in use in the real world.
3.1.1 Scenario. We consider the COMPAS (Correctional Of-
fender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) system,
which analyzes defendant’s answers to a large questionnaire with
questions across a range of categories in order to predict risk of
criminal activity. COMPAS has been adopted across various juris-
dictions in the US to assist with tasks from the judicial domain,
including decisions about bail, sentencing lengths and parole [5].
Our survey beginswith the following: “Judges in Broward County,
Florida, have started using a computer program to help them decide
which defendants can be released on bail before trial. The computer
program they are using takes into account information about <fea-
ture>. For example, the computer program will take into account
the defendant’s answer to the following question: <question>.”
These items were asked for ten features related to the COMPAS
tool, outlined in Table 1.2 These features were drawn from the cat-
egories in the COMPAS questionnaire, and the example question
for that feature was extracted from the corresponding category in
the questionnaire [50]. We use this scenario in two pilot surveys
and the main survey, as discussed below.
3.1.2 Pilot Survey 1: Fairness Judgments andTheir Latent
Reasons. In Pilot survey 1, we sought to learn whether respondents
found the above scenario fair, and why they felt it was fair or unfair.
We asked people to assess whether the scenario was fair on a
7-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.
2For a full description of the features, as used in the survey, please see https:
//fate-computing.mpi-sws.org/procedural_fairness/
Predictive Feature Example Question
1. Current Charges Are you currently charged with a misdemeanor, non-violent felony or violent felony?
2. Criminal History: self How many times have you violated your parole?
3. Substance Abuse Did you use heroin, cocaine, crack or meth as a juvenile?
4. Stability of Employment & Living Situation How often do you have trouble paying bills?
5. Personality Do you have the ability to “sweet talk” people into getting what you want?
6. Criminal Attitudes Do you think that a hungry person has a right to steal?
7. Neighborhood Safety Is there much crime in your neighborhood?
8. Criminal History: family and friends How many of your friends have ever been arrested?
9. Quality of Social Life & Free Time Do you often feel left out of things?
10. Education & School Behavior What were your usual grades in high school?
Table 1: The ten features assessed in our survey and the questions provided as examples in the scenario. The features and questions are drawn
from the COMPAS questionnaire.
0
0.2
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Figure 1: Properties used as justifications of fairness judgments
in Pilot survey 1. For each property, the plot shows the percentage
of responses that used it as a justification of the fairness judgment.
Note that multiple properties can be used as a justification for a
single judgment.
Specifically, we asked: “Please rate how much you agree with the
following statement: It is fair to determine if a person can be re-
leased on bail using information about their <feature>.” Then we
asked them to select their reasons for why it was fair or unfair, pro-
viding the eight latent properties as answer options (as described
below, for Pilot survey 2) , while also providing an “Other” option
with a text-entry box. Participants who rated the scenario as unfair
(from 1-3) were only asked why it was unfair, and participants who
rated the scenario as fair (from 5-7) were only asked why it was
fair. Participants who gave the scenario a neutral rating (4) were
asked both questions. Participants were asked this set of questions
for each of the ten features in Table 1, with the order in which the
features were presented between respondents randomized.
Takeaways.We used Pilot survey 1 to assess whether the properties
we propose in Section 2 are necessary and sufficient to capture
people’s reasoning about fairness. We find that each property was
used by at least 15% of respondents to explain why they rated a
particular feature as fair or unfair to use (Figure 1). Interestingly,
the properties that were used as explanations of fairness judgments
the most frequently are not related to notions of discrimination:
Relevance is the most used property, used in 74% of the responses,
followed by Causes Outcome and Reliability, used in more than 40%
of the responses.
Further, less than 3% of respondents selected the “Other” option
for why they judged a scenario as fair or unfair. Thematic analy-
sis [9] of responses provided in the “Other” category reveals that
the majority of these responses still map to one of our eight prop-
erties. The frequent selection of each of our proposed properties,
and the low proportion of “Other” responses, suggest that we are
unlikely to be missing an important assessment criterion.
3.1.3 Pilot Survey 2: Latent Properties of Features. In Pilot
survey 2 we sought to explore how people evaluate the latent prop-
erties of features from our framework. Here we asked no fairness-
related questions, in order to control for the effect of asking about
fairness on latent property ratings, as discussed in Section 3.4.
We presented the scenario and asked people to assess the value
of the eight properties of the features on the same 7-point Likert
scale. The properties were described as follows:
I. Reliability: Information about <feature> can be assessed reli-
ably.
II. Relevance: Information about <feature> is relevant for making
this decision.
III. Privacy: Information about <feature> is private.
IV. Volitionality: A person can change <feature> by making a
choice or decision.
V. Causes Outcome: <feature> can cause them to breach their
bail.
VI. Causes Vicious Cycle: Making this decision using informa-
tion about <feature> can cause a vicious cycle.
VII. Causes Disparity in Outcomes: Making this decision using
information about <feature> can have negative effects on cer-
tain groups of people that are protected by law (e.g., based on
race, gender, age, religion, national origin, disability status).
VIII. Caused by Sensitive Group Membership: <feature> can
be caused by their belonging to a group protected by law
(e.g., race, gender, age, religion, national origin, disability
status).
The order inwhich the features and latent properties were presented
was randomized between respondents.
Takeaways. As we ask no fairness-related questions in Pilot survey
2, we use it to examine latent property assessments independent
of fairness. The results of this survey can help us understand the
bias that is introduced by asking about both latent properties and
fairness. To quantify this bias, we compare the results of this survey
to those generated from our Main survey, described below, which
included both latent property rating and fairness rating questions.
The details of this comparison are discussed in Section 3.4.
3.1.4 Main Survey: Fairness Judgments and Latent Prop-
erties of Features. In the Main survey we sought to evaluate
whether people’s judgments about the latent properties of features
proposed in our framework were relevant to their judgments about
the fairness of features.
In the Main survey, we asked people questions about (i) the
fairness of features, as in the first question in Pilot survey 1, as well
as about (ii) their latent property assessments, as in Pilot survey
2. As in the pilot surveys, in the Main survey, this set of fairness
and latent property assessment questions was asked for each of
the ten features from Table 1, with the order of features and latent
properties being randomized between respondents. Additionally,
we randomized whether the fairness question was presented before
or after the questions about the latent properties.
3.1.5 Questionnaire Validity. To ensure that survey partici-
pants can meaningfully interpret our questions, we pre-tested all
items in the questionnaires using cognitive interviews. Cognitive in-
terviews involve asking participants to think aloud to the researcher
as they take the survey. This approach is a survey methodology
best-practice for ensuring construct validity and questionnaire
accuracy [49, 59]. We conducted cognitive interviews with five
demographically diverse participants, recruited using the Prolific
crowdsourcing platform, and iteratively refined our questionnaires
based on participant feedback until new considerations stopped
emerging.
Once we were satisfied with the validity of our questionnaire,
we collected our final sample for analysis. To mitigate the effects of
order bias [52], we randomized the order of questions described in
Sections 3.1.2-3.1.4. Finally, we included an attention-check ques-
tion to ensure that participants were thoughtfully answering the
questionnaire items [36].
3.2 Survey Samples and their Demographics
TheMain survey samples consisted of 196 AmazonMechanical Turk
(AMT) master workers from the US and 380 US respondents with
census-representative demographics, collected using the survey
recruitment firm Survey Sampling International (SSI).
We sampled users from two different platforms in our main sur-
vey, because we were concerned about both representativeness
and quality of user responses. AMT users are known to provide re-
sponses of equal or, often, higher quality than survey panel respon-
dents [10, 16]. However, AMTworkers are not demographically rep-
resentative of the U.S. population due to selection bias introduced
by differences between those who sign up for AMT and the general
population [52]. SSI and other such sampling firms, on the other
hand, use a myriad of different recruitment mechanisms to reduce
selection bias and ensure that a demographically-representative
sample is recruited.
Table 2 shows the demographics of our AMT and SSI survey
samples, compared with the 2016 U.S. Census [57]. We find that our
AMT respondents consisted of considerably fewer females (43%),
more Caucasians (76%), more highly educated individuals (51% hold
at least a college degree), and more liberals (57%) than the U.S.
population. This educational skew in AMT population is consistent
with observations from previous research studies [31, 45, 53]. On
the other hand, our SSI respondents were census-representative to
Demographic Attribute AMT SSI Census
Male 55% 44% 49%
Female 43% 55% 51%
African American 9% 12% 13%
Asian 3% 4% 6%
Caucasian 76% 71% 61%
Hispanic 8% 11% 18%
Other 2% 2% 4%
<B.S. 47% 68% 70%
B.S.+ 51% 32% 30%
Liberal 57% 37% 33%*
Conservative 17% 24% 29%*
Moderate 21% 33% 34%*
Other 5% 6% 4%*
Table 2: Demographics of our AMT and SSI survey samples com-
pared to the 2016 U.S. Census [57]. Figures marked with a * were
compared to Pew data [48] for political leaning.
within 5% along the demographics of gender (55% female), education
(32% with a BS or above), and political leaning (37% liberal). While
more of our SSI respondents identify as Caucasian (71%) than in the
U.S. population, a possible explanation could be that respondents
may have selected only Caucasian rather than both Hispanic and
Caucasian in response to our race and ethnicity question, since it
was not multiple-option.
3.3 Analysis Methods
In our analysis we measure the consensus amongst people’s ratings
of fairness and latent property values using Shannon entropy [55]
calculated over the probability distributions over the answers. Shan-
non entropy [3, 23] and measures derived from Shannon entropy
[30, 56] are frequently used to quantify consensus. We calculate
the Shannon Entropy normalized between 0 and 1 (NSE), and re-
port values of consensus calculated as 1 − NSE, so that complete
consensus corresponds to 1 and complete disagreement to 0.
We also examine the predictive power of our framework by build-
ing a binary classifier that predicts if a feature will be considered fair
(completely, mostly, slightly, neutral) or unfair (completely, mostly,
slightly), based on the values of its latent properties. The training
data consists of respondents’ evaluations of latent properties, and
binarized evaluations of fairness. We train a logistic regression
model with L2 regularization, implemented with the Python Scikit-
learn package [46]. To evaluate the model, we randomly split the
data into 50%/50% train/test folds five times, and report the average
accuracy and AUC. Further, we randomly select one of the five runs
and analyze its missclassiffications on the whole data; the other
runs yielded qualitatively similar results.
3.4 Discussion of Limitations
As in all survey studies, self-report biases may affect the data. As
described in Section 3.1.5 we have tried to mitigate these self-report
biases as much as possible through extensive pre-testing and the
adoption of best practices for question randomization.
As noted above, we used Pilot survey 2 to measure the amount of
bias introduced into our data by asking about fairness judgments
in the same survey as we ask about the latent properties. We cal-
culate the probability distribution over latent property ratings for
(i) Pilot survey 2 (the control), where we do not ask about fairness,
Fraction of People Rating Feature Consensus
Mean Unfair Fair 1 - NSE
Feature fairness 1 2 3 1-3 4 5-7 5 6 7 7 pt 3 pt
1. Current Charges 6.38 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.95 0.12 0.18 0.65 0.46 0.78
2. Criminal History: self 6.37 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.94 0.08 0.22 0.64 0.45 0.75
3. Substance Abuse 4.84 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.24 0.07 0.68 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.07 0.28
4. Stability of Employment 4.49 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.29 0.09 0.62 0.26 0.24 0.12 0.06 0.20
5. Personality 3.87 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.44 0.10 0.46 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.14
6. Criminal Attitudes 3.63 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.51 0.09 0.40 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.15
7. Neighborhood Safety 3.14 0.28 0.21 0.15 0.64 0.07 0.30 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.25
8. Criminal History: family and friends 2.78 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.67 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.27
9. Quality of Social Life & Free Time 2.70 0.38 0.20 0.12 0.70 0.07 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.29
10. Education & School Behavior 2.70 0.34 0.22 0.14 0.71 0.08 0.21 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.29
Table 3: People’s judgments on the fairness of using features, and the consensus in their responses, for the AMT sample. The reported values
of consensus are calculated as 1 - Normalized Shannon Entropy (NSE) of the responses. In the 7 point column, we report consensus across the
whole range of responses. In the 3 point column, we report consensus across responses bucketed into three main fairness categories: unfair
(1-3), neutral (4) and fair (5-7).
and (ii) the Main survey, where we ask about fairness and latent
properties. We see that the KL-divergence [37] from (i) to (ii) is
very low, achieving values below 0.1 for 90% of the questions, and
below 0.14 for the remaining 10%. We interpret these results, in
accordance with [11], as showing that if (i) is the real distribution
of people’s assessments, (ii) is a good approximation of it. There-
fore, we conclude that assessments of latent property values are
minimally affected by questions about fairness.
Self-report studies may also suffer from generalizability biases,
as those who take these surveys may not be representative of the
general population. In order to maximize both generalizability and
data quality we recruit both a census-representative population
and an AMT sample, as detailed in Section 3.2. Finally, it is possible
that people may feel differently about fairness in different contexts.
Future work should seek to validate whether a model that produces
actual results based on self-report inputs such as ours aligns with
“real-world” fairness perceptions when people are placed in more
ecologically-valid situations with decision-making algorithms.
4 ANALYZING FAIRNESS JUDGMENTS
We first compare respondents’ judgments on the fairness of using
different features in our algorithmic decision-making scenario, and
then explore the degree to which they reach consensus in their
judgments on the usage of any given feature. Throughout the paper,
we conduct our analysis on two datasets: responses of AMT master
workers, which are of higher quality, and responses gathered by SSI,
which are less demographically biased. Since both datasets exhibit
similar trends, we describe the AMT results in detail, including only
a brief comparison of the results between the two samples3.
Across Different Features.We find that some features are, on av-
erage, considered more fair to use than others. As shown in Table 3,
AMT respondents rate Current Charges and Criminal History as
mostly fair to use, with mean ratings close to 6.4. On the other hand,
Education & School Behavior, Quality of Social Life, and Criminal
History of Family and Friends, are rated as somewhat unfair to use,
3For the full results on the SSI dataset, please see https://fate-computing.mpi-sws.org/
procedural_fairness/
with mean ratings close to 2.7. The remaining features have more
neutral mean ratings, between slightly unfair (rating 3) and slightly
fair (rating 5).
Table 3 also shows that more than half of the respondents judged
five of the ten features as unfair (i.e., gave a fairness rating between
1 and 3) to be used in this decision-making scenario. However, as
none of these features directly capture sensitive group membership
information such as race or gender of the defendant, their use for
risk prediction is not restricted by anti-discrimination laws. Thus,
our findings suggest that unfairness concerns about algorithmic
decisions are much broader than just concerns about discrimination.
Across Different Users. Next, we analyze the extent to which
fairness judgments related to the use of any feature vary across
the respondent population. Upon closer examination, we note that
respondents achieve high consensus on only two of the ten features.
In Table 3, we observe that the features Current Charges and
Criminal History achieve high consensus, with 95% and 94% of
respondents, respectively, agreeing that it is fair to use these fea-
tures in the algorithmic decision-making process. For many of
the remaining features, there is a reasonable consensus amongst
respondents, with a two-thirds majority considering the feature
either unfair (by assigning ratings between 1 and 3) or unfair (by
assigning ratings between 5 and 7). However, for Personality and
Criminal Attitudes, we see very low consensus, with neither “fair”
nor “unfair” receiving more than a > 51% slender majority vote.
Table 3 also shows consensus in fairness judgments for different
features measured using normalized Shannon entropy (1-NSE). We
observe that features with mean ratings close to neutral (rating
4) such as Personality and Criminal Attitudes exhibit little consen-
sus, with judgments of respondents spread across the entire rating
spectrum from 1 through 7. Perhaps surprisingly, respondents also
exhibit low consensus on features rated as least fair to use, such as
Education & School Behavior. It is possible that societal consensus
for or against the use of these features is still evolving, unlike the
broad consensus against using features like race or gender that has
been codified in anti-discrimination laws.
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Figure 2: Consensus in fairness judgments and assessments of latent properties, for the AMT sample. The plots show values of consensus on
fairness and the latent properties: [Left] which exhibit a higher degree of consensus, [Right] which exhibit a lower degree of consensus.
Impact of Sample Populations. The ranking of features with re-
spect to mean fairness is similar across AMT and SSI respondents.
However, we note that SSI respondents, in general, reach less con-
sensus on their fairness ratings than AMT respondents. A possible
explanation is that compared to AMT workers, SSI respondents
represent a more-random and diverse subsample of the general
population, and thus report a wider range of opinions.
Summary. A majority of our survey respondents judged half of
the features used by the COMPAS tool as unfair to use in predicting
a defendant’s risk of criminal activity. None of the features directly
capture sensitive group information such as race or gender, high-
lighting the need to account for unfairness considerations beyond
those related to discrimination, the sole consideration for most
existing works on algorithmic fairness. However, our findings also
suggest that societal consensus around these other unfairness con-
siderations might be considerably less evolved than those around
discrimination.
5 ANALYZING FAIRNESS REASONING
In this section, we explore the possible causes of the lack of consen-
sus in respondents’ fairness judgments observed in Section 4. To
this end, we leverage the eight latent properties that we outlined
in Section 2 as the heuristic basis for how people judge the fairness
of using a feature. Specifically, we will first examine how people
assess the latent properties for different features and then analyze
how the latent property assessments can be mapped to (i.e., used
to predict) fairness judgments. In the process, we hope to attribute
the disagreements in fairness judgments to either (i) disagreements
in the latent property assessments by respondents or (ii) disagree-
ments in the reasoning respondents use to reach fairness judgments
from latent properties.
5.1 Latent Property Assessments
In Figure 2, we compare the degree of consensus in how respon-
dents assessed the eight properties for different COMPAS input
features. In general, we observe that people tend to disagree in their
assessments of all latent properties for at least one or more features.
However, a closer look reveals important differences. First, eval-
uations of most latent properties related to causality, namely causes
vicious cycles, caused by sensitive features, causes disparity in out-
comes, causal relationship with outcomes, and volitionality, appear
particularly controversial and exhibit low consensus (< 0.5) for all
input features (shown in the right graph of Figure 2.) The consen-
sus around latent properties related to any feature’s potential to
cause discrimination, namely caused by sensitive features and causes
disparity in outcomes, is even lower (< 0.2). Our observations have
important implications for recent proposals to avoid algorithmic
discrimination through causal reasoning [8, 34, 39, 42, 51, 54, 63].
These works often assume that a causal graph, representing causal
relationships between features and outcomes is given as an input to
the algorithms. However, our findings suggest that getting people
to agree on a single causal graph would be a non-trivial challenge.
Second, evaluations of other latent properties not based on
causality, namely relevance, reliability, and privacy, achieve high
consensus (> 0.5) on at least some input features (shown in the left
graph of Figure 2.) Additionally, we observe that high consensus
in these latter latent property estimates corresponds to high con-
sensus in respondents’ fairness judgments over the corresponding
input features.
Thus, we find that (a) our respondents tend to disagree more in
their assessments of causal relationships between input features
and predicted outcomes than in their assessments of non-causality
related latent properties, and (b) consensus, or lack thereof, in cer-
tain latent property assessments appears to be strongly correlated
with consensus in fairness judgments. In the following section, we
quantify the predictive power of the latent property assessments
on fairness judgments.
Impact of Sample Populations.We omit the plot on consensus
in latent property assessments of our SSI respondents due to space
constraints. But, similar to our findings about consensus in fairness
judgments, we find that SSI respondents reach less consensus in
their latent property assessments than AMT respondents.
5.2 Modeling & Predicting Fairness Judgments
We now attempt to model fairness reasoning of our respondents
by attempting to predict their fairness judgments about an input
feature based only on their assessments of the feature’s latent prop-
erties. Our insight is as follows: If all our respondents used a similar
Sample Neutral Judgments Accuracy AUC
AMT included 0.882 0.879excluded 0.905 0.904
SSI included 0.872 0.816excluded 0.878 0.852
Table 4: Accuracy and AUC of binary classifier predicting feature-
fairness judgments based on latent property ratings. Binary classi-
fication was performed once with assigning neutral ratings to the
fair class in the ground truth, and once excluding neutral fairness
judgments from the data, for each sample.
reasoning to arrive at fairness judgments from their latent property
estimates, we should be able to learn a single predictor (mapping
function) that would perform well for most, if not all, respondents.
If different respondents used different reasonings, then no single
predictor would perform well for most respondents. Finally, if we
failed to learn predictors that would perform well at the level of in-
dividual users, one could question the validity of our entire fairness
reasoning framework (discussed in Section 2.)
We train a binary logistic regression classifier, as described in
Section 3.3, and report the results in Table 4. For both datasets, the
classifier achieves very high accuracy (88% for AMT and 87% for
SSI) when predicting respondents’ fairness judgments based on the
underlying property ratings they assigned.
Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
# Judgments 391 249 195 136 321 280 388
%Misclassified 0.06 0.16 0.36 0.33 0.09 0.04 0.01
Avg P Correct 0.91 0.78 0.60 0.61 0.82 0.91 0.98
Std P Correct 0.19 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.08
Table 5: Characterization of misclassifications of our model, by
fairness rating value, for the AMT sample. The first row shows the
total number of entries that received a certain rating, while the sec-
ond row shows the fraction of those instances that were misclassi-
fied by our model. The third and fourth row report on the average
value and standard deviation of the probability of being assigned to
the correct class respectively.
In Table 5, we examine the few misclassifications of our model
further by studying how they are distributed over the ground-truth
fairness ratings provided by AMT respondents. We observe that
for features that were rated as very unfair (1, 2) or very fair (6,
7), our model makes even fewer mistakes. On the other hand, for
neutral ratings (4), it performs close to random. In fact, the average
probability that the classifier predicts the correct class rating for a
response and its standard deviation – which can be interpreted as
the confidence that the model has in its predictions – shows that our
model is not only highly accurate but it is also fairly well calibrated.
That is, it is highly confident (and highly accurate) in its predictions
for very unfair or very fair judgments, but it has low confidence (and
low accuracy) in its predictions for neutral (neither unfair nor fair)
judgments. We hypothesize that these neutral ratings are difficult
to predict, as people may not have clear reasoning underlying their
judgments.
Finally, we check if our classifier offers highly accurate predic-
tions for most respondents. Figure 3 shows a cumulative distribu-
tion of inaccurate predictions across the population of respondents.
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Figure 3: Characterization of misclassifications of our model, per
respondent. The plot shows the CDF of the probability distribution
of mistakes over respondents.
We see that our single classifier can make highly accurate (>= 80%
accuracy) for most (> 85%) of all our AMT respondents.
These results suggest that our proposed framework is quite effec-
tive at modeling people’s moral judgments about fairness of feature
use. The high accuracy of our predictions for most respondents
strongly suggests (i) that our eight latent properties are largely suffi-
cient to explain how users arrive at their fairness judgments and (ii)
that most respondents are using similar reasoning at reaching their
fairness judgments from latent properties, even as they disagree on
the assessments of the latent properties in the first place.
Relative Impact of Latent Properties on Fairness Judgments.
In order to estimate the relative importance of our latent properties
on respondents’ fairness judgments, we study the odds ratios for
the logistic regression model described above. In this model, we
also include as factors the survey sample source (AMT or SSI) and a
mixed-effects term to account for the multiple judgments provided
by each person in our sample. Table 6 summarizes our results.
Latent Property O.R. C.I. p-value
Reliability 1.27 [1.2, 1.35] <0.001*
Relevance 2.47 [2.32, 2.63] <0.001*
Privacy 0.95 [0.9, 1] 0.049*
Volitionality 1.18 [1.13, 1.25] <0.001*
Causes Outcome 1.29 [1.21, 1.37] <0.001*
Vicious Cycle 0.84 [0.79, 0.9] <0.001*
Causes Disparity 0.95 [0.89, 1.02] 0.159
Caused by Sensitive 1.03 [0.96, 1.09] 0.429
Sample: SSI 1.54 [1.29, 1.84] <0.001*
Table 6: Binary logistic regression model with binary fairness rat-
ing as the outcome variable. In addition to the latent properties, the
model also included as inputs the sample source (SSI vs. AMT) and
a mixed-effects term to account for multiple measurements from a
single survey respondent. O.R. is the log-adjusted regression coef-
ficient (odds ratio), C.I. is the 95% confidence interval for the O.R.,
and p-values < 0.05 are considered significant as dented by a *.
After controlling for mixed effects, we find that SSI respondents
are more likely to rate a scenario as fair than AMT respondents.
As one might expect, we find that our respondents were more
likely to judge the use of a feature fair, the more they felt that the
feature was volitional, relevant, reliable, and caused the outcome.
On the other hand, respondents were less likely to judge the use
of a feature as fair if they felt that the feature used was privacy
sensitive, or resulted in a vicious cycle. We find that, while all of
the eight properties helped in prediction, caused by sensitive group
membership and causes disparity in outcomes were not significantly
related to judgments in this particular scenario. Finally, we find that
relevance had the strongest effect, with the odds of respondents
rating the scenario as fair increasing 2.47 times for every point
higher they rated it as relevant (on a 7-point Likert scale).
Note that our analysis here is meant only to illustrate how our
approach could be used to estimate how people implicitly weigh
latent properties of features when making judgments about using
features in algorithmic decisions. However, we do not expect these
specific odds ratios to necessarily hold in other scenarios.
5.3 Explaining Fairness Disagreements
Our findings above strongly imply that fairness disagreements
likely arise out of disagreements in how people assess latent prop-
erties of features rather than how they use the latent properties to
reason about fairness of using the features. To confirm this implica-
tion, we used our model from Subsection 5.2 to predict the fairness
of using different features. Our model is trained on a random sub-
set of AMT responses, and applied on latent property estimates of
the remaining AMT responses, to compute the resulting fairness
judgments.
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Figure 4: Consensus in the fairness predictions of our model, com-
pared to the consensus in the ground truth fairness judgments, as-
signed by people.
Figure 4 compares the consensus in the predicted fairness judg-
ments with the consensus in the ground truth fairness judgments,
assigned by respondents. We observe that the consensus on pre-
dicted fairness ratings tracks the consensus on ground truth judg-
ments of fairness quite well. Given that any lack of consensus in
the predicted fairness can be attributed solely to differences in the
assessments of the latent properties, we can attribute a significant
part of the lack of consensus in human fairness judgments to the
differences in people’s assessments of latent properties.
5.4 Summary
Overall, our findings validate the framework for reaching fairness
judgments that we proposed in Section 2. We find significant dis-
agreements in respondents’ assessments of many latent properties,
particularly those related to causal relationships between input
features and their causal influence on prediction outcomes. How-
ever, across all respondents we find evidence of strong consensus
in the reasoning used to reach fairness judgments from latent prop-
erties. Specifically, we showed that we could learn a single, simple
predictor of fairness judgments from latent property assessments
that performs with high accuracy across most of our respondents.
For the scenario of our survey, the predictor might be regarded
as modeling a common fairness judgment heuristic used by our
respondent population. We do not argue that the common heuristic
is “objectively true”. In fact, we expect the heuristic to depend on
cultural norms of the society. It would be interesting to conduct
similar studies in other societies where people may apply different
moral reasoning to the US population considered here.
6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Most existing works on algorithmic fairness focus on unfairness
due to discrimination, where people receive relatively disadvanta-
geous outcomes based on their membership in certain social groups,
e.g., based on race or gender. Further, existing works take a norma-
tive approach to addressing algorithmic discrimination, i.e., they
prescribe how non-discriminatory decisions ought to be made. In
contrast, in this work, we take a descriptive approach to algorith-
mic fairness, i.e., we ask people what they perceive as unfair in
decision making, and analyze the reasons behind their unfairness
perceptions.
Our study focused on how people perceive the unfairness of
using different features describing a defendant to algorithmically
predict the defendant’s risk of engaging in criminal activity in the
near future. Our survey study reveals several interesting findings:
(i) People’s concerns about the unfairness of using a feature extend
far beyond discrimination, including consideration of latent prop-
erties such as the relevance of the feature to the decision making
scenario and the reliability with which the feature can be assessed.
(ii) Unfortunately, there are considerable disagreements on which
features different people perceive as unfair to use. (iii) The lack of
consensus can be attributed to disagreements in how people assess
the latent properties of the features, particularly those related to
causal relationships between input features and their causal influ-
ence on outcomes. (iv) Encouragingly, different people appear to
share a common heuristic (i.e., a similar reasoning) when reaching
their fairness judgment from their assessments of latent properties.
Our observations yield several implications for future studies on
algorithmic fairness: (i) While there are important reasons based
on historic prejudice to mitigate discrimination, there is strong
evidence here to consider additional unfairness concerns. (ii) The
lack of consensus on causal relationships between input features
and outcomes raises challenges for approaches to fairness based
on causal reasoning which require a known causal structure (one
recent approach can incorporate multiple structures [54]). (iii) On
the other hand, our findings highlight the desirability of trying to
gather more objective causal data. (iv) Such objective data on latent
properties, if possible, could then be used as inputs to a common
fairness heuristic (moral reasoning), which our evidence indicates
is shared by most people, to arrive at consensus fairness judgments.
It would be interesting to explore the extent to which this heuristic
varies across different cultures and decision making contexts.
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